This study explores patterns in the voluntary disclosure of greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and empirical relationships between GHG emissions and an extensive range of business performance measures for UK FTSE-350 listed firms over the first decade of such reporting and highlighting the level of consistency among these measures. Despite the popular and policy generated environmental imperatives over this period, an extensive pattern of non-reporting of such emissions is apparent by year and sector. Accordingly, a two-stage (Heckman type) selection model is used to analyse the emissions-performance nexus conditional upon the firm choosing to report, using bootstrap inference to further ensure robustness of the results. The results demonstrate firstly that emissions reporting are not directly influenced by the social/governance disclosure attitudes of a firm, thus suggesting that firms disassociate environmental responsibility from social responsibility. Additionally it is demonstrated that for those firms that do report, there is a clear non-linear relationship, initially increasing with firm performance and then decreasing.
SEEC research output includes SEEDS -Surrey Energy Economic Discussion paper Series and SEERS -Surrey Energy Economic Report Series (details at www.seec.surrey.ac.uk/Research/SEEDS.htm) as well as a range of other academic papers, books and monographs. SEEC also runs workshops and conferences that bring together academics and practitioners to explore and discuss the important energy issues of the day SEEC also attracts a large proportion of the School's PhD students and oversees the MSc in Energy Economics & Policy. Many students have successfully completed their MSc and/or PhD in energy economics and gone on to very interesting and rewarding careers, both in academia and the energy industry.
2002, Brunnermeier et al. 2003 , Cole et al. 2006 , Frondel et al. 2008 Innes 2010, Kassinis and Vafeas 2006, Wagner 2010) . Horváthová (2010) undertakes an extensive review of this work and reports on a meta-regression of 64 outcomes from 37 empirical studies in the "firm-environmental performance nexus" and finds, "….that the likelihood of finding a negative link between EP (environmental performance) and FP (financial performance) significantly increases when using the correlation coefficients and portfolio studies. On the other hand, the use of multiple regressions and panel data technique has no effect on the outcome. This suggests that it is important to account for omitted variable biases such as unobserved firm heterogeneity. The results also suggest that appropriate time coverage is important in order to establish a positive link between EP and FP. This suggests that it takes time for environmental regulation to materialise in financial performance." p.56. Horváthová's (2010) review also seems to point to a paucity of robust, extensive empirical GHG emissions-performance studies over a reasonable time frame at the firm-level. This is despite numerous lobby group, media and Government policy-led exhortations to, and initiatives for, firms to reduce their level of GHG emissions. These are generally framed as parts of various concerted actions to combat climate change and encourage permanent adoption of more environmentally sustainable modes of production.
Thus, this study explores the empirical relationship between a very extensive range of the most typically reported and deployed business performance measures and reported GHG emissions (all readily accessible via the Bloomberg (2013) The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. The next section provides some background to the basis, advantages and limitations of the most common business performance indicators used. A brief retrospect on the guiding theoretical and empirical literature pertaining to emission-firm performance linkages is then presented which informs the choice of key hypotheses investigated. Data issues and the modelling strategy employed are considered in the following two sections. The results are then presented and discussed with a summary of findings and some concluding remarks proffered in the final section.
Measuring Performance
It is important to consider a comprehensive range of different accepted measures of performance, as businesses have many stakeholders (such as shareholders, bankers, employees, and tax authorities) whose interests in the firm differ (Johnston and Pongatichat, 2008) . Shareholders, for instance, may focus more on profits, whilst bankers focus on both cash-flow-related performance metrics, such as operating cash flows and capital structure (Leverage). On the contrary, tax authorities may focus on profit before tax and employees on sales. Besides, accounting policies (e.g. depreciation method) or differences on capital structure or financing decisions (e.g. leasing) induce performance asymmetries in the short run that necessitate the need to account for alternative performance measures. The broad range of business performance measures used in this study are Sales, Net Income, Operating Profits, Before Tax Profits, Market Capitalisation, Stock price, Asset, Equity, ROA (Return on Assets) , ROE (Return on Equity), Tobin's Q and EBITDA (Earnings Before Interest, Tax, Depreciation and Amortization) , and Leverage is examined as a capital structure measure.
Definitions and a brief explanation of the examined measures are set out in Table 1 . The analysis of pollution by firms, particularly in economic theory has a long and distinguished history and its chronological context is set out in Kula (1998) and Pearce (2002) . Early contributions set out what has emerged to serve as a very durable stylized picture of the profit maximizing firm treating the atmosphere and other environmental media, such as seas and river basins, as essentially free goods in which to emit or dispose waste.
Economic theory therefore suggests that these free goods would be over-consumed by such firms to the material detriment of other firms and households. This was expected to become manifest in terms of the external costs (negative externality) of pollution being imposed on others through clean-up costs, deleterious health effects etc. Such simple stylized thinking, supplemented by analyses of property rights (see, for example, Coase 1960 , Dales, 1968 has informed the structuring and application by environmental regulators of a range of command and control instruments (total bans, emission standards, fines) as well as of economic incentive instruments (taxes, subsidies, tradable permits); for an overview see Baumol and Oates (1988) . These were intended to reduce or optimize the level of polluting emissions and were justified with reference to various measures or indicators of societal preferences.
In principle, however, such regulatory interventions would still need to be mindful of the neoclassical economic implication of profit maximization that firms would only expend the minimum cost necessary to comply with any given regulatory intervention and even weigh up the net cost implications of bypassing such interventions if monitoring, enforcement and punishment were weak.
Another theoretical strand, however, drawing initially and principally on case study evidence, recasts this body of theory premised on the assertion that increasing regulatory stringency may actually be profitable rather than costly (Porter 1991, Porter and van der Linde 1995) .
This argument, generally labelled 'the Porter hypothesis' is explained in terms of the stimulus to innovation afforded by tighter mandatory environmental regulations prompting cost-saving productive efficiencies. The conceptual and empirical basis for the hypothesis has been contested and augmented for testing in 'weak', 'narrow' and 'strong' forms (see, for example, Palmer et al 1995, Jaffe and Palmer 1998 , Lanoie et al 2011 , Ambec et al 2013 . In weak form it is simply asserted that environmental regulations can stimulate innovation. The narrow form suggests that flexible environmental policy regimes can better incentivise innovation than less flexible environmental policy regimes and the strong form suggests that well designed regulation can induce cost-saving innovations outweighing the costs of compliance with such regulations.
In a related vein, further theoretical strands of the firm-pollution emission discourse have also explored the motivations and scope for actually fostering voluntary over-compliance -i.e.
abating emissions some way above the minimum (statutory) requirement (Arora and Gangopadhyay, 1995 Anton et al. 2003) . 
2013).
In other cases the undertaking of voluntary over-compliance has simply been related to differences in regulatory stringency across countries and thereby offering, for example, some foreign direct investing firms competitive advantages by default, simply through their experience in their host country. Essentially, if regulatory stringency is expected to be on an upward trajectory in the country being invested in, then this intrinsic competitive advantage could be reinforced via green branding and marketing tactics and also accentuated as domestic firms struggle (in cost terms) to comply with tougher regulations. However, overcompliance may also arise for both foreign direct investing and domestic firms due to a desire to exploit cost-saving efficiency improvements that raise resource productivity by the firm, with the scale of activity, but, moreover, after a certain level of activity, that the level of emissions may also reduce in absolute terms (Dasgupta et al. 2002 , Dinda 2005 , Kijima et al. 2010 ).
Contradictory evidence has been found affirming and disputing the presence of curves at different levels of aggregation (see, for example, Perman and Stern 2003 , Millimet et al. 2003 , Dinda 2004 , Bertinelli and Strobl, 2005 , Chimeli and Braden 2005 , Fernández et al. 2012 . Nevertheless, some extension of this thinking into the corporate sector might have been expected to systematically investigate the potential widespread (cross-sectoral) existence of such curves with respect to GHGs at the firm-level, even though more difficult questions do arise as to the appropriate choice of a particular activity measure. In the related literature at the macro, sectoral and household level, income is generally used as the measure of activity. However, it would be reasonable to assert that business performance metrics are the more appropriate activity indicator at the firm level. Firms who perform better have arguably greater flexibility to invest in emissions-reducing activities, noting that these are sometimes both high upfront cost investments as well as low direct return investments.
Firms that are not performing so well will have less financial scope to take such emission abating actions. However, measuring performance is itself a difficult task, and arguably there is no clear single specific measure of performance for a firm. The main reason for this is that firms have different stakeholders who are interested in different objectives, and also that multinational firms may well have similar stakeholders from different geographic regions that may well place more or less importance on the same objectives.
In the light of this theoretical and empirical discourse and particularly that situated in the business performance-emissions nexus, three simple but key hypotheses warranting empirical investigation are posited: 
Data
The data are taken from the Bloomberg (2013) database and include all firms listed in the FTSE 350 index since 2000, and includes all available data up to the end of 2011. In principle, this data allows for several thousand firm-year observations, however, a significant amount of non-reporting of emissions among firms substantially reduces the sample sizes. The main variable of interest is the self-reported levels of emissions, which include all greenhouse gas emissions reported by the business that were created by the activity of the business. This includes a basket of gases that includes, but is not restricted to carbon dioxide emissions. The definition of business activity is quite general and does potentially incorporate both direct and indirect emissions, whereby the direct emissions are those which the reporting firm has direct control over, and the indirect emissions are those in which the firm has little or no direct control over, for instance elements of the wider supply chain. 
e There is a possible concern that since firms have proxy over their reporting standards, they may not report perfectly comparable pollutant levels. There is no way for this to be confirmed with the available data, though it is assumed that the reporting practices will be, by and large, consistent and hence comparable across firms.
Where e is the greenhouse gas emissions divided by the number of staff, and p is the performance indicator. The performance indicators are of two types, some are money metrics, and others are ratios: the money metric performance measures are divided by the number of staff, while the remaining measures (stock price, leverage, ROA, ROE and TOBQ) are not. To provide the most robust estimates possible, and ensure that parameter inference is robust to any heteroskedasticity the linear equations in (1) are estimated using a non-parametric
Bootstrap. The (residual based) bootstrap procedure provides inference upon a statistical model by using the ordinary least squares (OLS) residuals to represent the empirical distribution of shocks. These residuals are recorded, and re-ordered across the observations to allow any given observation to be subject to a different error, subsequently the model is reestimated by OLS and the coefficients are recorded as individual runs of a bootstrap. Thus, the bootstrap process evaluates how stable the estimated coefficients are to different data, where the differences in data are based on observed (unexplainable) variability. This is in effect the purpose of conventional (asymptotic) inference, but no longer depends on either normality of the residuals nor large sample sizes. See Efron and Tibsharini (1993) and Davison and Hinkley (1997) for further detailed discussion of non-parametric regression by least squares. The results reported in the following section concentrate on the mean coefficient value and the 95% confidence interval from 1,000 bootstrap replications. 
Correcting for self-reporting bias
To account for possible selection bias, the emissions function is re-estimated as a Heckman type selection problem. The latent system equations can be written as: 
Results and Discussion
This section presents and discusses the main results, taking each of the aforementioned hypotheses in turn. Tables 3 and 4 report the estimation results for CO2 and GHG emissions respectively based on Equation (1). Across the columns of these tables it is evident that there is a broad dichotomy between the two types of performance measures. For each of the alternative money metric based performance measures, with the exception of SALES, give strong evidence of a non-linear inverted U-shape relationship between performance and emissions.
For SALES the coefficient values broadly support the idea of an inverted U-shape, however the 95% confidence interval for the quadratic term passes through zero i.e. the confidence interval includes both positive and negative values, but whose range is predominantly negative. The absolute values of the coefficients in each of the columns vary, but this is to be expected given the different definitions of performance.
For the performance measures that are based on ratios, a slightly different picture emerges.
There are five measures falling into this category. Three of these measures, LEV, ROA and TOBQ appear to have no direct relationship with the emissions of a firm, neither for CO2 or GHG. The remaining two measures are related to emissions but not in the same way: for PRICE there is U-shape relationship e.g. with low stock prices a firm should expect higher emissions per-employee, gradually decreasing until some optimal point, and then increasing again after that; for ROE there is a an inverted U-shape relation with CO2 while only the linear performance measure is significant in the GHG equation. The U-shape finding for PRICE stands out clearly among the various performance measures.
Compared with the other performance measures PRICE is arguably more exogenous to the firm, with the actions and choices of financial analysts and investors being the primary determinant of stock prices, but also recognizing that the wider stability or otherwise of the financial market will also in part determine PRICE. An interesting implication of this finding is that environmentally conscious investors might have a preference towards mid-priced stocks, where 'mid' is loosely used here to refer to the region of the optimum on the Ushaped curve. Taking the results together, the evidence strongly supports the first hypothesis stating that emissions are functionally dependent on firm performance.
As discussed, Tables 3 and 4 suggest that a relationship between emissions and firm performance does exist and moreover is broadly in favour of a non-linear Kuznets-type relationship, albeit one that is slightly sensitive to the definition of performance. The performance measures considered here have been grouped into two types, based on their ability to be scaled by the number of firm employees. The difference between these two groups therefore can be attributed in part to the scale effect embedded in the per-employee transformation. In light of this the findings have one rationale being that when the physical scale of a firm is taken into account, it is much more likely that a relationship with emissions will be revealed. A complementary interpretation to this is that the ratio-based performance measures do not take sufficient account of the physical operations of the firm and their associated emission rates. Since these latter performance measures are arguably framed more towards illuminating financial performance/stability than the other measures, then this might indicate that financial stability or instability need not be a justification for sustaining yet higher levels of emissions.
Hypothesis 2: Business performance measures are not related to emissions identically.
Each of the performance measures are defined in different metrics, which is a direct result of their unique purposes. For example, TOBQ is a ratio intended to reflect an eclectic snapshot of overall firm performance and has a fundamentally different metric to SALES, with the latter being expressed in an easy to understand money metric. It stands to reason that their relationships with emissions should differ. To evaluate this hypothesis requires comparing in some way the same coefficients from the same model structures, but with different performance measures included on the right hand side. There are a number of ways that such hypotheses could be formulated, but a pragmatic approach is taken here.
As discussed with regard to the previous hypothesis, there are some substantial differences in how performance measures of different types are related to emissions. The fact that some illustrates significant Kuznet's-type curves, and others do not, is sufficient evidence so as to be unable to reject hypothesis 2. No effort is made here to reconcile such differences; rather the purpose here is to highlight their existence. These differences pose interesting concerns for environmental impact management, inasmuch as firms pursuing different performance objectives may be reasonably able to justify several alternative emissions levels as being admissible. Although not a focus of the present paper, it is abundantly clear that to reconcile their differences is a pressing priority for future study. 
This hypothesis is evaluated using the coefficient values from a Heckman selection type model which makes corrections for self-selection into emissions reporting.
The results to this point provide compelling evidence that a firm-level environmental Kuznetcurve does exist, but that it can be sensitive to the choice of performance measure used. The aim here is to consider the possibility that the conclusions so far might be sensitive to possible bases that can arise when modelling data involving self-selection (or pre-determined choices). Table 2 highlights the level of attrition in the dataset regarding the reporting of emissions, with only 256 observations being available from an initial sample of over 3,500 observations in principle. For the performance measures used, there is virtually full and complete data either from the stock market or from the mandatory company accounts. Hence, the level of attrition in reported emissions is due to self-selected non-reporting. In general over the sample period there has been no specific requirement on firms to report their emissions; however, some firms have chosen to adopt transparency principles as part of their corporate social responsibility activities. Giving a transparent view of emissions levels potentially serves as a signal to stakeholders of the integrity of a given firm, which could in turn generate some intangible added-value for the firm in terms of environmental warm-glow and/or customer and investor loyalty. An alternative view is that it simply provides another basis to question management performance in a difficult to control area such that widespread withholding of GHG data or deliberate neglect to measure GHG emissions may be implicitly deemed preferable.
The results of the selection models are reported in Tables 5 and 6 respectively. The results in Tables 5 and 6 compare fairly closely with Tables 3 and 4 , suggesting that the possible concerns that self-selection in to reporting may not be a source of major bias. Two notable differences come from the insignificance of the ASSETS and EQUITY performance measures under the selection model, although if a 20% significance level is seen as acceptable, then they both support the EKC hypothesis. Taken together the implications of this are that there are some bias affects that arise from the non-reporting, that appear to relate to the uncertainty in the relationship i.e. the variance on the estimated parameters.
For CO2 emissions, as given in Table 5, Overall, mitigating against the possible bias incurred from self-selection into emissions reporting, the confidence in the results is greatly increased, and hence is the confidence in the existence of a firm-level Kuznets-type curve. Regarding the fourth hypothesis, the evidence supports that voluntary disclosure does have some effect on the relationship between firm performance and emissions. Broadly speaking though, the evidence is not strong enough to suggest the EKC does not exist at the firm level. 
Summary and Concluding Remarks
The aim of this paper has been to examine the extent of UK firms' emissions reporting over the first decade of the 21 st century and to test whether firm performance and emissions levels are related to each other. Additionally whether the kinds of functional relationships discussed in the empirical environmental literature have some validity at the firm level are considered.
A wide range of performance measures are considered, to help validate the generality of the conclusions, as well as two definitions of emissions CO2 and the more encompassing measure of GHG. The measures are split into two types: money metric performance measures such as PROFITS or EQUITY, and ratio based performance measures such as LEV and TOBQ. A clear inverted U-shape is found when benchmarking against money metric based performance measures, while the evidence is less strong when using ratio based performance measures. These patterns are consistent across both types of emissions considered, albeit stronger for CO2 than GHG, and are also robust to possible biases that might arise from selfreporting.
To some degree the results pose questions regarding the role of environmental performance management and the possible conflict that may arise from environmental targets that can be potentially benchmarked against a range of alternative business performance measures. A more specific quandary emerging from the analysis, deserving of future study, relates to the apparent sensitivity of the results to money-metric versus ratio based measures of firm performance. TOBQ could arguably conflate several aspects of performance, making it more difficult for a stable result to emerge using this measure, but other ratios such as LEV and ROA are more difficult to defend. The model here embeds simple linear specifications, implying one of two things, either these performance measures share no relation with emissions, or on the other hand, maybe a relationship does exist, but is non-linear of a higher order than a simple inverted U-shape can handle. Both options are worth exploring further, though perhaps the former holds greater weight, since these two measures in particular are arguably more uniquely connected to the financial wealth of a firm, whereas the other performance measures more closely reflect, to a greater or lesser degree, the physical operations which will ultimately be the source of the emissions.
